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Post-Soviet Russia has had the will to dominate its neighbors, but it no longer has the
capability. Its Central Eurasian neighbors are much stronger and more conﬁdent about
their independence, and Russia’s inﬂuence is being effectively challenged there by China,
the West, and the democratic economies of Asia. Unable to modernize its economy and
armed forces, Russia has failed to achieve most of the main objectives (excluding NATO,
regaining trade exclusivity, ending drug, arms, and terrorist inﬁltration) it has set for itself
in the “near abroad.” In view of Russia’s admitted weakness and its excessive reliance on
oil and gas exports, some of its leaders favor redirecting its efforts to improving relations
with the West. Aside from Central Asia, where Russia is cooperating with NATO in
combating extreme Islamists operating in Afghanistan, Russia is trying to establish an
Eurasian customs union with Kazakhstan and Belarus. But relations with most of the
others have deteriorated to some degree in recent years.
Copyright  2012, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Henry Kissinger taught us that in foreign affairs the
crucial variables are capability and will. Without the will to
dominate, and the capability, other states have little reason
to worry. We will argue here that although Russia under
Vladimir Putin has had thewill to dominate its neighbors, it
no longer has the capability. Besides its own materialr).
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sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Haweakness, Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors are much
stronger and more conﬁdent about their independence.
Russia’s inﬂuence is being challenged effectively by China
and the West.
On a number of recent occasions the top Russian lead-
ership has expressed its special interest in the ex-Soviet
republics that now independent. Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin has called the dissolution of the USSR and its empire
one of the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century,
though he denies trying to reconstitute it.2 On Russian
television on August 31, 2008, President Dmitri Medvedev
referred to his country’s “privileged interests” in the near
abroad, where many Russian ethnics still live – many with
Russian citizenship, too. More recently Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov claimed “unique relations”with the countries2 “There is no talk of reforming the USSR in some form.It would be
naïve to restore or copy what has been abandoned in the past, but close
integration on the basis of new values, politics, and the economy is the
order of the day,” said PM Putin. Charles Clover and Isabel Gorst, “Putin
urges creation of Eurasian Union,” Financial Times, October 5, 2001, p. 3.
nyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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“civilizational unity.” Late in 2011, as Prime Minister Putin
announced his plans to return to the Presidency, he called
for a stronger “Eurasian Union” to include Belarus and
Kazakhstan immediately, and Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan later.3 This broader group would negotiate with
the European Union and the small European Free Trade
Association for free trade area across the Eurasian conti-
nent to Vladivostok.4
Under Putin’s leadership since 2000Russian foreign
policy became more ambitious and assertive. Beginning in
2003 and up to 2008 rising revenues from oil and gas
strengthened the apparent consensus among Kremlin
policymakers and the public in favor of restoring Russia’s
dominant role in the now independent parts of the former
Soviet Union. None of those new states has achieved
adequate countervailing power to defend itself in any
confrontation with Russia. Even for the new members of
NATO – the Baltics, as well as Poland and the rest of the
former satellite states of East Central Europe – it is far from
clear how vigorously the older members of NATO would
defend the interests of these newer ones, let alone
prospective members, such as Georgia or Ukraine.
Eleven of ex-Soviet republics are members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but at its 20th
anniversary celebration in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, three of
the presidents failed to show up. CIS provisions for a free
trade area have lain dormant for years. At an earlier
meeting, some of the leaders had the effrontery to express
disapproval of Russia’s invasion of Georgia, a rare Russian
use of force since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbaev, one of Rus-
sia’s best friends, released this statement just after the
invasion: “The principle of territorial integrity is recognized
by the entire international community. Difﬁcult interethnic
issues should beworked out through peaceful negotiations.
There can be no military solution for such conﬂicts.” At
a subsequent meeting of the Chinese-initiated Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, Russia’s fellow members
refused to join in recognizing the independence of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, separatist parts of the Republic of
Georgia. Instead, Russia’s erstwhile colonies called for all
parties in the Caucasus to resolve “existing problems”
through dialog and negotiation, not the use of force. Russia
stood alone diplomatically.Russia’s priority objectives in the “near abroad”
To appraise Russia’s success in asserting its will one
must analyze Moscow’s objectives in the “near abroad,” as
evidence by Kremlin statements and actions. (1) First and
foremost, Russia has expressed a strategic concern to
exclude NATO from areas close to its borders. At a European
security conference, President Putin said that NATO3 Izvestia, October 4, 2011. Irina Filatova, “Putin Calls for a New
‘Eurasian Union of Former Soviet Countries,” MoscowTimes, October 5,
2011.
4 The four EFTA has fewer than 14 million inhabitants; the 27-member
EU has more than 500 million and borders on the Russian Federation.expansion into the Baltics and potentially into the Caucasus
and Ukraine “represents a serious provocation that reduces
the level of mutual trust.” Any and all placement of missiles
or troops in those areas would complicate Russian
defenses, which traditionally depend on strategic depth.
Russian diplomats remember that former U.S. Secretary of
State James Baker promised that reuniﬁcation of Germany
would not lead to such NATO expansion. Strobe Talbott,
former Ambassador-at-large and special assistant to the
secretary of state in the subsequent administration of
President Bill Clinton, admitted to us at a reception that,
yes, Baker had made this promise, but it was “not an ofﬁcial
commitment of the US government.”
Quite obviously, this Russian objective of excluding NATO
near its borders has not been achieved. President Clinton
pushed NATOmembership through for Poland and the Baltic
three – all adjacent to recognized Russian territory. In Central
Asia, following the Al Qaeda attack on the World Trade
Center and Pentagon, American airmen were stationed in
Uzbekistan from 2001 to 2005, followed by German airmen
on behalf of NATO after that. Now Uzbekistan, the most
powerful Central Asian state, has again increased its coop-
eration with NATO efforts in Afghanistan, and the Obama
Administration is talking with President Islam Karimov
about using routes through Uzbekistan to supply NATO from
the north, instead of mostly through Pakistan, as well as
a return to the Termez airport transit point.
NATO also has an airbase in Kyrgyzstan and servicemen
in Tajikistan. All these countries, most noticeably Georgia,
receive American military training and equipment to
replace aging Soviet types. Kazakhstan is also a member of
NATO’s Partnership for Peace, though it balances its posi-
tion by buying advanced Russian missile and artillery
weapons and intends to set up a single air defense system.5
Georgia has declared its “goal to joining the Euro-Atlantic
institutions, particularly the EU and NATO,” something
only the Baltic states among former Soviet republics have
actually achieved.6
As a match for NATO, some time ago Russia initiated the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Although this
organization has some rapid reaction forces on paper, they
have never been used. It has been rumored in Tashkent,
capital of Uzbekistan, that President Karimovwill once again
secede from the CSTO, the Russian-sponsored military alli-
ance. Accordingly, the Russian head of the CSTO, General
Nikolai Bordyuzha has suggested that the CSTO henceforth
work by majority rule, not unanimity. If so, it would seem,
Uzbekistan will surely withdraw. But neither Russia nor
anyone else wished to intervene in the June, 2010, riots
between Kyrgyz and local Uzbeksin and around Osh. Appar-
ently the Russian military doubted the effectiveness of
deploying “peacekeepers” in the complicated ethnic fabric of
southern Kyrgyzstan. And Uzbekistan objected, along with5 Interfax KazakhstanOnline, September 22, 2011.
6 Giorgi Baramidze [Vice Prime Minister of Georgia and State Minister
on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration], “Tbilisi in the Crosshairs,”
The Journal of International Security Affairs no. 20 (Spring/Summer, 2011),
p. 82. Russia’s foreign minister stated in April, 2008, that his government
“will do everything” to prevent this eventuality. The new US ambassador
to Moscow has declared Washington’s interest in it, though.
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protested a plan to build a secondRussianmilitary base in the
south of the Kyrgyz Republic near the Uzbek border.
Similar results have been observed for the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, which has degenerated into
a talking forum with no real military or economic effect in
itself.8 Its “Peace Mission 2010” involved only ofﬁcers from
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in an exer-
cise.9 Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan are quite
willing to participate in this latter organization, sponsored
by China. They have all agreed to host Confucius Institutes
for the study of Mandarin Chinese. Chinese universities
have accepted many Central Asian students, so Russia’s
cultural preeminence as lingua franca of the older genera-
tion of ofﬁcials is slipping. As the Oriental saying has it,
“The friendly calf can suck on two mothers.” Or three.
(2) A second vital interest of Russia in the near abroad is
interdiction of drugs, contagious disease, arms, and Islamist
terrorists. Islamists from Chechnya are active in and around
the Caucasus. Chechnya itself is paciﬁed but hardly peaceful.
Seventy Russian policemen and others have been killed in
“increasingly ungovernable” Dagestan and Ingushetia.10
More recently explosions of two car bombs killed
a Russian policeman and wounded some dozens of others in
the capital of Dagestan, the largely Muslim and ethnically
diverse Russian Federation republic in the north Caucasus
region.11 Resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan might
encourage Islamists within Russia’s southern border.12 Were
the Taliban to prevail in northern Afghanistan, they might
well make common cause with hither-to suppressed oppo-
nents of the Central Asian regimes and thus threaten Russian
interests there. The ﬂow of narcotics to Russia’s millions of
addicts, many of whom are victims of HIV, has not abated.
This is one consequence of Russian involvement inTajikistan,
where the drug-related illness is rising fast. According to our
sources, Russian airmen engage in transporting opium from
the wild Afghanistan border with Tajikistan to markets
within Russia and further west. With a polio epidemic in
nearby Tajikistan, the disease has spread because of neglect,
and in the summer of 2010 Russia registered the ﬁrst cases of
polio in Uzbek migrant laborers.13
(3) Russia’s top elite, the so-called siloviki, make their
fabulous incomes by taking their cut of the country’s7 Stephen Blank, “A Sino-Uzbek Axis in Central Asia?” Central Asia-
Caucasus Analyst 12:16, September 1, 2010.
8 Erica Marat, The Military and the State in Central Asia. London: Rout-
ledge, 2010, p. 85.
9 Interfax KazakhstanOnline, September 2, 2010.
10 The Economist, September 6, 2008, p. 30. The situation in 2009 is
tantamount to “civil war.” Ibid., January 30, 2010, p. 63. “Chechnya.is
now a brutal dictatorship toying with sharia governance. The Muslim
fundamentalist insurgence has spread to previously quiet Dagestan,
Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria, while the MoscowMetro, planes, and
an airport have been targets of devastating terrorist attacks.” Leon Aron,
“Russia’s Deep Despair,” The New Republic, March 24, 2011, p. 13.
11 Financial Times, September 23,2011, p. 4.
12 According to Sergei Prikhodko, chief foreign policy advisor to the
Russian President.RFE/RL, Feb. 4, 2009.
13 Interview with “senior international ofﬁcial” in Bishkek by the
International Crisis Group in September, 2010. Central Asia: Decay and
Decline, Crisis Group Asia Report no. 2010, February 3, 2011, p. 20.wealth of raw materials and its transit fees, earned by the
oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia and Ukraine over
Russian territory. Keeping the money ﬂowing is thus a third
objective. In Soviet times Russia was able to obtain an
unlimited share of the oil and natural gas from Central
Asian at prices permitting proﬁtable resale in Europe. But
now the situation in the oil and gas sector is gradually
slipping away from Gazprom, Russia’s energy monopolist
throughout most of Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan have allowed
gas pipelines to be built by Chinese workers to supply the
People’s Republic’s considerable energy needs. Azerbaijan
and Georgia agreed to construction of the BTC oil pipeline
from the Caspian to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the
Mediterranean Sea, with the encouragement of American
ofﬁcials. The EU intends to build the Nabucco gas pipeline
from Caspian sources to European markets. All this
competition has meant that Russia’s Gazprommust pay up
and lose proﬁts, as ﬁnal prices to consumers are likely to
decline, as shale gas supplies increase worldwide.
Gazprom has tried to block new outside construction by
buying up some of its possible gas supply. Several existing
pipelines from Central Asia traverse Ukraine and gives that
country (more precisely, its small elite) access to natural
gas, legally or illegally, and transit fees. Consequently,
Russia has had to construct new and expensive undersea
lines under the Black and Baltic seas to its customers and
now plans the rival South Stream pipeline in the Balkans.14
In other industries Russian companies are still active.
Kazakhstan’s coal and electricity sector has been attractive
for some Russian investors.15 Despite Uzbekistan’s objec-
tions, Russia is helping build the Sangtuda hydroelectric
station on the Vakhsh River of Tajikistan – crucial for
aluminum development – and has promised to build three
low-capacity hydropower stations (CASA-100) to transmit
electricity to Afghanistan. President Rakhmon personally
asked President Medvedev to approve a new railroad line
from Tajikistan north to Russia so as to bypass Uzbekistan.
This request was not received positively.
Russia has backed off from doing a similar hydro project
in the Kyrgyz Republic because of political instability there.
Long suspicious of Russian initiatives in the political and
military arenas, Uzbekistan has nevertheless welcomed
Moscow’s interest in developing its petroleum reserves,
and gas sales continue, too.
(4) Yet another Russian objective is to reconstitute near
exclusivity in trade with the near abroad, on terms favorable to
Moscow. Because of their failure so far to be admitted to the
World Trade Organization (WTO), owing to Georgia’s veto,
Russia is again trying to fortify its commercial position
elsewhere in the near abroad. The Eurasian Economic
Community (EurAsEC), a project long championed by
Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbaev, has diverse14 Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov assert that Gazprom’s costs of
construction have been $3 million per km, two to three times higher than
the world average. Andei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, “Why Moscow
Says No,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011, p. 127.
15 Vladimir Paramonov, “Russia’s Energy Challenges,” The Journal of
International Security Affair s, no. 20 (Spring/Summer 2011), p. 133.
20 In 2007 Kazakhstan took 35% of its imports from Russia, but this
includes transit trade originating in other countries. The other Central
Asians imported 8-26% of their purchases from or through Russia, with
China’s share roughly equal to the Russian’s in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
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union with a common external tariff and single set of
regulations for movement of labor and capital. If Moscow
has it way, this will be a monetary union as well, with the
ruble a single regional currency, instead of dollars or euros.
From the beginning of 2010 the Russia-Kazakhstan-Belarus
customs union began to operate,16 albeit with some excep-
tions.17 This arrangement is supposed to expand in January,
2012, to a “common economic space”with free passage of all
goods and services, aswell as capital, with a common (ruble)
currency to follow, on the model of the European Union.
Adopting the Russian external tariffs has meant that the
duty on automobiles rose from 10% to 30–35%, or more on
used vehicles. Because the Russian tariff imposed on
Kazakhstanmakes automobiles from Japan, Uzbekistan, and
elsewhere far more expensive, well-off Kazakhstanis have
been unhappy with the customs union. This is a clear
attempt to make Russian-made automobiles like the Lada
competitive, despite their poor quality. For Kazakhstanis
a Toyota Camry went from $22,000 to $40,000, and the
prices of leather and medicines also rose very noticeably,
“provoking indignation among consumers in Kazakhstan.”18
According to Bolat Abilov, co-chairman of the oppositionist
social democratic party Azat, the tariffs have also made food
and fuel much more expensive this year. “We think there is
a very dangerous risk of another political union between
Russia and Kazakhstan” by the anniversary of the Bolshevik
Revolution ﬁve years from now.19
What auto-exporter Uzbekistan will do is not yet clear,
but Russian ambitions to establish a “common economic
space” by 2012 would seem to require more members, and
more ﬁscal and monetary coordination than has been
possible in the past. Given the much wider usefulness of
dollars or euros, as well as Russia’s inﬂation and unstable
ruble values, that proposal seems unlikely to appeal to
Moscow’s partners.
Despite the proximity and commercial contacts with
Russian-speakers in the near abroad, all of the ex-Soviet
republics have tried to diversify their trade. They send
their natural resources and agricultural products – such as
cotton, gold, uranium, aluminum, and animal products – to
the best world markets, rather than Russia, though Russia
remains a signiﬁcant customer for ores, fruit, and natural
gas. The southern tier countries buy an increasing share of
cheap consumer goods from China, Turkey, and the Persian
Gulf. Capital goods come in from Germany, making that
country unusually interested in close relations with the16 Kazakhstan and Belarus add about 25 million population to Russia’s
141 million, although the former two have somewhat lower buying
power.
17 A few types of goods are still exempt. Some border checkpoints
between Russia and Kazakhstan have been closed, while some new ones
with Uzbekistan have been opened. There are still some barriers to
imports into Belarus as of October, 2011.
18 Kenjail Tinbai, “A semi-Soviet Union is born,” TOL, March 2, 2010. The
negative effects on Kazakhstan were recognized by Russian observers at
a conference in Ekaterinburg in February. Aleksei Starostin, “Politologi
schitaet, chto Rossiia dolzhna usilit svoe prisutstvie v Tsental’noi Azii.” It
was further stated that the customs union could hardly succeed without
Uzbekistan.
19 Clover and Gorst, Financial Times, October 5, 2011, p. 3.authoritarian regimes of Central Asia. Except for atomic
reactors and some arms, Russia is simply not competitive.20
An interesting example of the challenges Russia
encounters doing business in Central Asia is the case of
Talco, the Tajik aluminum company that accounts for about
60 per cent of that country’s exports. Up to 2004, the high
point of Russian-Tajik relationships, the Russian conglom-
erate Rusal handled Talco trading operations, but in 2006
Rusal was displaced by the Norwegian ﬁrm Hydro. The
Norwegians agreed to some shady ﬁnancial arrangement
that diverted the fabulous proﬁts from Talco to President
Rakhmon and his associates, rather than the Tajik treasury.21Relations with the neighbors mostly worse
Active diplomacy on the part of Russia has tried to
establish “cooperative” relationships with its neighbors. The
most important is Ukraine is at work. Elections there in 2010
in Ukraine has brought Viktor Yanukovych to power, mostly
owing to the failures of his predecessor, Victor Yushchenko
the previous pro-Western Ukrainian president closely asso-
ciated with the Orange Revolution. Supposed to be pro-
Russian, Yanukovych is known to favor the Russian
language over Ukrainian and has rejected the charge of
deliberate genocide in the Holodomor famine of 1932–1933.
The anti-Russian genocide interpretation had been empha-
sized by Yushchenko. It is reported that Yanukovych has also
tolerated Russian penetration of the Ukrainian SBU secret
service.22 The new president soon agreed to extend Russia’s
basing rights at the naval base at Sevastopol beyond 2017.
Russia soon announced amodernization and expansion of its
military capability there. In return, Kyiv was supposed to
obtain a discount from theworld price on its vital natural gas
supply from Russia, rather than the price negotiated in 2009
by PrimeMinister Yulia Tymoshenko. But this concession has
not been forthcoming. Ukraine is actively negotiating free
trade and association agreements with the EU – a popular
orientation formostUkrainiansbutunwelcometoMoscow.23
So now Russia seems to be insisting that Ukraine join its
EurAsEc gambit instead before it receives the discount.24 The
Kremlin has also initiated a “low-grade trade war” withThe OECD countries are important competitors in Uzbekistan (19%) and
Turkmenistan (22%). IMF Directions of Trade Statistics, June, 2008.
21 John Heatherstraw, “Tajikistan amidst globalization: state failure or
state transformation?” Central Asian Survey, vol. 30, no. 1 (March, 2011),
147-68. Apparently some IMF payments went in the same way.
22 TarasKuzio, “Ukraine’s Foreignand Security Policy Controlled byRussia,”
EurasiaDailyMonitor,October 18, 2010, publishedby JamestownFoundation.
23 Ukraine’s export potential into the EU is questionable. Its manufac-
tured products are low quality and its food and grain would face the EU’s
protected Common Agricultural Policy.
24 Roman Olearchyk, “Moscow offers Kiev cheap gas,” Financial Times,
April 13, 2011. Ukraine could gain a market for its grain and steel in Europe
but would have to accept the EU’s quality consumer goods. The EU dele-
gation is also pressing Yanukovych to drop the charges against former
PrimeMinister Yulia Timoshenko for supposedly exceeding her authority in
negotiating a 2009 gas deal with Moscow. Financial Times, Septmeber 30,
2011, p. 6. On Russia’s demand, see Reuters, September 25, 2011.
29 F. Ismailzade, “Russian Arms to Armenia Could Change Azebaijan’s
M.C. Spechler, D.R. Spechler / Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 1–7 5Ukraine and is trying to collect a $400 million debt Kyiv is
supposed to owe from Tymoshenko’s time in ofﬁce.25
Despite even stronger Russian pressures Georgia has
been amenable than Ukraine. For years Georgia’s pro-
American president Mikheil Saakashvili had threatened
the use of force to retake control of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, territories assigned to the Georgian SSR as part of
the Soviet Union but occupied by Russian “peacekeepers.”26
Saakashvili proclaimed his desire to join NATO, a possibility
unacceptable to Moscow. Georgia had increased its military
budget by some ten times since 2004, and by 2008 it
constituted a full 5 per cent of its GDP, according to the
authoritative Stockholm Institute for Peace Research.27
Russia had evidently also been preparing for war, but
when Georgians came under ﬁre from Russia’s local allies,
the impetuous Saakashvili attacked ﬁrst.28 Russian forces
moved into still more Georgian territory in a previously
rehearsed ﬁve-day campaign supported by a cyber-attack
on Georgian communications. Russian troops still occupy
land in Georgia proper and have continued to build up
bases and armed forces in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
break-off territories Russia (but hardly anyone else)
recognizes as independent. Besides South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, where ethnic Georgians have been pushed out,
Russian troops are in violation of the Cease-ﬁre Agreement
negotiated by the EU. OSCE and UN monitoring missions
have been prevented from entering Russian-occupied
territories claimed by Georgia. Russia has tried to intimi-
date other arms suppliers, such as Israel, to stop deliveries
to Georgia. Russia also still boycotts Georgia’s exports.
President Saakashvili, whose term expires in 2013, has
recently run into increased criticism from domestic oppo-
nents for his authoritarian ways, despite signiﬁcant
economic reforms. But his hopes for American support
have apparently fallen victim to the Obama administration
hopes for a “reset” with Putin’s Russia with regard to more
important issues, such as Iran. Saakashvili has beenwarned
that, although the USA will help with some material
assistance, Georgia should not expect military support for
any adventure to recapture the two break-away provinces.
Indeed, in 2010 the Georgian leader renounced the use of
force to recover the lost territories. Nonetheless, the new
American ambassador to Moscow, the noted academic
Michael McFaul, has reiterated Washington’s rejection of
Russian occupation of Georgian territory. The US will not
force Georgia to go along with Russia’s application to the
World Trade Organization. Rather,Washington favors Swiss
mediation of the WTO matter. The fact that Georgia
supplies soldiers for the NATO mission in Afghanistan25 The Economist, September 24, 2011, p. 65.
26 A third such area, Ajaria, was recovered, partly through Russian
mediation. André Liebich, review of Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick
Starr, The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia. N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe,
2009. Like the Russian Federation itself, Georgia has always had signiﬁ-
cant non-Georgian ethnic populations, some of whom have closer ties to
Moscow than to Tbilisi.
27 Noted in Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 18, 2009.
28 According to the Tagliavini Report of the EU. Council of the European
Union, “Independent international fact-ﬁning mission on the conﬂict in
Georgia report,” vol. III, 2009. www.ceiig.ch/Report.html.undoubtedly plays a part in assuring this continued, if
moderated, support.
Russia has been backing Armenia in its mounting
tension with neighboring Azerbaijan over Armenia’s occu-
pation of the Karabakh region and other areas once part of
the Azerbaijani SSR. A new bilateral defense treaty commits
Russia to defend Armenia from an Azerbaijani attack,
provided more arms against that eventuality, extended the
lease on the Gyumri base for another three decades.29
Publicly, however, Moscow continues to work for a solu-
tion on acceptable terms. This has not prevented Azerbaijan
from developing new energy routes and contacts with
Western customers, to Russia’s disadvantage, and the arms
it is buying may create problems for Russia in the future.
In nearby Moldova, Russia has stubbornly maintained
its military support of the outlaw Transdniester regime in
the eastern part of Moldova. In response to that and Ger-
many’s insistence on withdrawal of Russian troops – with
support of fellow NATO members Poland and Romania –
the newMoldovan government has taken a pro-EU position
and is hoping for military assistance from Romania as well.
Even so, the “near abroad” institutions supposed to bind
the region together have largely failed. At a recent meeting
of the CIS, supposedly a coordinating body through which
Russia tries to exercise leadership, only six of the eleven
presidents from the “near abroad” bothered to show up.
The meeting adjourned after 30 min. According to Alexei
Malashenko of Moscow’s liberal Carnegie Center, the
countries of the former Soviet Union see such organizations
as the CIS and EurAsEC “as ruled by Russia, and they would
like to deal with Russia in private.”30
In short, while Russia has the will to control the near
abroad, it may not have to do much actively to do so. And
anyway it doesn’t have the capability, given the resistance
from China and the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus.Russia’s economic weakness
Russia’s basic economic condition has deteriorated
since 2007, when it achieved a very good growth rate of
8%.31 Two-thirds of Russia’s hard-currency exports still
come from oil and gas. When oil prices, which are noto-
riously volatile, dropped in early 2009, GDP was down
almost 10%, and has recovered little since. Taxes on those
export provide half of its budget revenues, so budget
deﬁcits of 8–9% appeared early in 2009 when oil prices fellForeign Policy Orientation,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst 11:2 (January
28, 2009).
30 Johnson’s Russian List, October 5, 2011.
31 Up to 2007 Russia was able to increase its oil production, now
standing at 501 metric tons per year, reduce its gross debt, raise foreign
direct investment considerably and cut unemployment from 10.6% in
2000 to 6.2% in 2005-08. Life expectancy, which reﬂect declining
morbidity from alcoholism, for 2005-10 is estimated by the Russian State
Statistical Service 67.7 years, but Russia population has shrunk from 146.9
million to 141.9, reﬂecting a crude birth rate of 12 per thousand as of 2008
and a relatively high death rate of 15/1000. World Development Indicators
2010, p.64. High oil prices lately have allowed GDP growth of about 4%,
though it also funded approximately $50 billion in capital exports from
the Russian Federation.
39 The Economist, September 10, 2011, p. 27. To leave permanently means
obtaining entry visas, a contract, or student fellowshipsdnot easy
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about 4%, so at present Russia is muddling through. But the
consumer price inﬂation rate has accelerated to nearly 9%
during 2011.32 Oil prices have been around $80 per barrel
at this writing, not high enough to allow the Russian
Federation to balance its budget, though enough to fuel
imported consumption goods and allow rich Russians to
travel and send money abroad to buy luxuries and real
estate.33 Even with average oil prices now, the trade
surplus and ruble have declined, according to the Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit and IMF, but the Russian elite still
can send money abroad.
Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin used high oil prices in
the last two years to build up a reserve of about $500 billion
and to reduce Russia’s foreign debt to about 10% of its GDP.
Nevertheless, in the eyes of Russia’s young and technical
population, the prospects are not encouraging and many
have left for the West, despite the current recession. About
$50 billion in assets left with them this year, and the ruble
declined some 15% from August, 2011. Private net outﬂows
have been considerable since 2008, according to the
Central Bank of Russia.34
Oil and gas production volumes are stable or decreasing,
and world competition from LNG, Qatar, and new oil ﬁelds
is cutting into Russian demand. Finance Minister Kudrin
recently stated “Economic growth based on oil has been
exhausted.”35 Prime Minister Putin, though prone to brag
about his country as an “energy superpower,” has called for
more diversiﬁcation. It won’t be easy. For instance, Wal-
mart’s persistent attempt to enter the Russian market by
purchasing one of its backward retail chains failed. Said
a source familiar with the reason: bureaucrats “did not
want another whiner like Ikea, which had exposed
corruption.”36
Overall government spending in the Russian Federation
has risen to 40%, and once-and-future President Putin has
announced a $630 billion program for military moderni-
zation, a plan which together with social spending forced
Kudrin to resign in protest.37 Some $200 billion had to be
spent of state reserves to bail out banks and failing facto-
ries. Industrial and R&D investments have been paltry.38
Instead of investing in schools, hospitals, and its deterio-
rated infrastructure, Putin’s regime has given out subsidies
to obsolete factories in one-company towns. A leading
example is the Avtovaz plant, which employs 70,000
workers to make the out-of-date Lada, a holdover from
Soviet time. Since the fall of the Soviet Union only one
cement factory has been built and no new oil reﬁnery. A
World Bank study from 2007 found that only 5% of ﬁrms32 The Economist, September 10, 2011, p. 105.
33 More than $21 billion left the country in 2010, not to mention more
than 1.25 million citizens in the last few years, according to ofﬁcial
ﬁgures.
34 The Economist, September 10, 2011, p. 28.
35 Leon Aron, “Russia’s Deep Despair,” The New Republic, March 24, 2011,
p. 13.
36 Ibid.
37 The Financial Times, September 28, 2011, p. 15.
38 Investments in science are but 1.5% of GDP. Paul Starobin, “Silicon
Implant,” The New Republic, February 17, 2011, p. 18.were renewed in the previous decade – a quarter of the rate
in healthy Western economies.
Popular opinion is pessimistic. Judging by actions of its
own citizens and investors, Russia’s longer-term prospects
are unsatisfactory. According to the well-known Levada
Centre poll, 22% of Russia’s adult population would like to
leave the country for good – three times the proportion just
three years ago. That includes even higher fractions of
younger, high-income adults. Among entrepreneurs and
students,more thanhalfwould leavepermanently, andabout
a thirdofprofessionals.39 The leading causesmentionedwere
“an unreasonably high cost of living, low quality of medical
services, andwidespread corruption amongpublic servants.”
Half a million Russian-speaking immigrants in California
include many mathematicians, programmers, and engi-
neers.40 Somearekeyentrepreneurs.Oneof them,Google co-
founder Sergey Brin, has described his native land as “Nigeria
with snow.” A World Bank study of Russian science and
engineering students studying in America found that 77%
will not go back to their native land.41
Campden Media and UBS, asked 19 Russian businessmen
with more than $50 million in personal assets about their
plans. Of these 17 said they had moved their wealth abroad
and might sell their companies, whose turnover exceeded
$100 million, rather than passing them on to their children,
now typically studying in the West for future business
careers there.42 Commented Nadia Wells of the global fund
Capital Group, “if your elite is not reinvesting in Russia, why
shouldwe invest here?” She noted that comparedwith other
emerging markets Russian assets, such as energy ﬁelds,
trade at a discount of as much as 40%.43Consequences of material weakness for policy in
Eurasia
Not surprisingly in consequence of this weakness, Russia
has reneged on promises to lend money to some of its
neighbors.44 Even an important $150 billion development
project in the north Caucasus (a chaotic part of the Russian
Federation) had to be canceled.45 Russian analysts are
groaning about their country’s lost positions in its erstwhile
colonies. The well-known commentator Victoria Panﬁlova
writes, “Russia is becoming alienated from Central Asia.”46
Russia’s more liquid competitors are moving in on the
Eurasian economies. Most notably, the Chinese havematters. As of now, Russians do not have visa-free travel to western
Europe, quite an annoyance for those with property or vacation plans in
southern France.
40 Ibid.
41 The Economist, September 10, 2011, p. 30.
42 The Economist, September 10, 2011, p. 30.
43 Gregory L. White, “Putin Touts Russian Economic Power,” Wall Street
Journal, October 7, 2011, p. A12.
44 Russia had pledged some $7.5 billion to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The
Baltic Times, no. 705, May 26, 2010. Estimated total investment in the
region as of early 2010 was about $4.7 billion. Paramonov, p. 134.
45 Olof Staaf in Central Asian and Caucasus Analyst, August 17, 2011.
46 Nezavisimaya gazeta, January 18, 2010, p. 11, translated in Current
Digest of the Russian Press, vol. 62, no. 4 (January 25, 2010).
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a cool $5 billion and lent that ﬁnancially troubled country
a further $5 billion.47 Already China’s state-owned National
Petroleum Company produces a ﬁfth of all Kazakhstan’s oil
output.48 Turkmenistan is to receive a $4 billion loan to
develop one of its promising gas ﬁelds. Turkmenistan’s new
president Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov signed contracts
withﬁrms fromChina, SouthKorea, and theUAEworthalmost
$10 billion to develop the very promising South Yolotan
ﬁelds.49 European ofﬁcials have renewed their interest in
Turkmen gas to be piped in across the Caspian and Black seas.
Turkmenistan’s pipeline with China through Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstanopened in late2009.Russiahas found itself outbid
and excluded from business prospects in this authoritarian
state.
Kyrgyzstan has obtained military equipment from the
Chinese, too, while Moscow’s planned assistance to Kyr-
gyzstan’s troubled energy sector has been aborted. A Russian
loan of $100 million for the Kambarata-1 power station in
southern Kyrgyzstan was apparently wasted, as was
previous ﬁnancial aid of $450 million, so Moscow suspend-
ing a $1.7 billion loan early last year.50 Nor do they wish to
press for reform of any kind. Tajikistan has several Chinese
factories working with Chinese labor. China’s Import-Export
Bank is the largest investor in Tajikistan’s road network.5147 China holds majority stakes in ﬁfteen companies operating in
Kazakhstan’s energy sector; more than 30% of the crude oil produced in
2010 was expected to go to China through joint pipelines.
48 Simon Pirani, review of T.N. Marketos, China’s Energy Politics in Central
Asian Quarterly, no. 2, 2011.
49 Richard Pomfret, “Exploiting Energy and Mineral Resources in Central
Asia, Azerbaijan and Mongolia,” Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 53
(March, 2011), p. 20.
50 Crisis Group Asia Report, p. 13. Viktoria Panﬁlova, “Kyrgyzskie
kacheli,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 26, 2010.
51 Crisis Group Asia Report, p. 17.South Korean ﬁrms have made signiﬁcant investments
in Central Asia for some time. Not long ago the Republic of
Korea announced it will lend Uzbekistan $30 million for an
information technology and education project. Korea
Resources Corporation will mine uranium, iron, and gold in
the country, according to The Korea Herald. South Korea will
also develop the Surgil gas ﬁeld jointly with Uzbekistan and
build a chemical plant nearby, at an estimated cost of $3
billion. Korea’s well-known consumer goods companies are
also quite active in the region, and both India and Japan are
trying to do more business there.
Conclusion
Russia’s economic and military decline is far from the
biggest problem world statesmen have these days in
foreign affairs. Russia is no longer a threat to most of its
neighbors, nor an ideological threat. Most of the Eurasian
countries of the “near abroad” prefer to deal independently
with all the major powers. Russia remains a rival in some
situations, such as Iranian nuclear ambitions, but Kremlin
leaders also have some interests similar to those of North
Atlantic and the Paciﬁc rim: preventing war, opposing
Islamist extremism, reducing the ﬂow of drugs and arms to
criminals, and stabilizing the world’s atmosphere.
